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This essay is based on Aliza Herberg's final paper for the CRP Department's Cities in a Global World
taught by Dr. Laura Tate in the Winter quarter of 2018. Open to all majors, the class explores the social
and economic implications of urbanization and the international political economy on global cities, such as
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global challenges through specific case studies, such as the one discussed by Aliza in this essay.

T

he world’s urban population is growing at an unprecedented rate; one half of the world’s population is already living
in urban areas (Emmerij ,1997, p. 104). Urban life often draws
people from rural areas due to it’s “better quality and more
choice in education, material comforts, medical care, employment opportunities, and self-expression. It [the urban setting]
provides a wide variety of skills, services, cultures, delivery systems, and so on” (Emmerij 1997: 105). The benefts of the urban
setting are especially attractive to impoverished rural dwellers who aspire for a better quality of life. While the growth of
megacities often benefts the respective national economy
and incorporates the country into the global world system,
there are many social and environmental consequences associated with urban growth.
Urban life and increasing urbanization shares and exacerbates
its own host of social issues, including “poverty, housing, unemployment and underemployment, slums, crime, drugs,
and street children” (Emmerij, 1997, p. 105). These issues are a
consequence of the “growing urban [economic] dualism and
informalization,” a phenomenon that emerges with increasing economic inequality, creating an inevitable divide among
the powerful and wealthy elite and the impoverished masses.
Poverty and marginalization are embedded as an inevitable
aspect of the social structure of the megacity (Emmerij, 1997,
p. 104). This paradox manifests itself in most urban spaces and
is further intensifed in periphery countries due to the lack of
social services that would mitigate inequality.
Yemen’s geopolitical and economic circumstances put the
country in a disadvantaged position in a highly contested region of the world, Southwest Asia and North Africa (also known
as the Middle East). Yemen has one of the highest populations
in the Middle East, yet it has the lowest Gross Domestic Product in the entire region and lacks adequate infrastructure and

political control to sustain the growing needs of the country.
The country’s arid environmental conditions strain the available environmental resources, especially water, leading the
entire region into an era of constant drought and insecurity.
The constant arid climate is magnifed by climate changes and
desertifcation, making freshwater access a constant challenge
for Yemeni people.
Urban areas are particularly vulnerable to water shortages because of high population density. Sana’a, Yemen’s capital and
the densest urban area in the country, faces constant water
scarcity and issues of poor management. The country has a relatively weak central government system, preventing enforcement of policy measures to aid in public water management
(Hovden, 2015). Yemen’s inadequate and unsustainable water
infrastructure, including the reliance on depleting groundwater aquifers and infltration of contaminated water, dramatically contributes to Sana’a’s water insecurity. Social and political conditions within Yemen, such as the localized social power
structure, civil unrest and violence, and the national addiction
to the water-intensive stimulant “Khat,” all further worsen the
water scarcity and threaten the stability of the region.
Yemen’s Social Organization
Specifcally related to public water law and management in Yemen, responsibility and power is considered a region-specifc
issue due to the “tribal social structure” that shapes the political
landscape “based on the collective responsibility and accountability of tribal leaders (sheikhs) to their communities” (Al-Sabahi & De Santis, 2016, p. 56). Experts in Yemen water management fnd that this local “tribal” organization is an important
variable which may cause a group to either defy or accept
broader water management laws, further complicating eforts
towards political stabilization and achieving peace (Mis, 2015).
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This regional water organization is intertwined with traditional
principles of the Islamic system, also known as ala’ala-fa-ala’ala,
a principle that gives “upstream land senior irrigation rights
over downstream land” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 3). This principle is
applicable when managing fresh surface water, including rivers, lakes, and streams. However, due to Yemen’s arid physical
geography and climate, Yemen relies on groundwater aquifers
for 70% of the water supply, in which cases ala’ala-fa-ala’ala
would not apply (Al-Weshali, et al., 2015, p. 216). Groundwater
is an equally distributed resource because it is below ground
and any successful well can reach the aquifer, whereas surface water makes access unequally distributed due to geography proximity near the water source. “Islamic principles treat
[groundwater] as a communal property with a possibility of
private ownership under special circumstances,” according to
Yemen water expert Mohamed Al-Hamdi’s dissertation titled
“Competition for Scarce Groundwater in the Sana’a Plain, Yemen: A study of the incentives for urban and agricultural water
use.” Spatial constraints regarding water access and distribution are reifed by the localized system of power and social
structure, challenging any potential national policy reform regarding water management.
The tribal social structure, grounded in the power of the sheikh,
is reifed as “people lose faith in government institutions” from
unstable national authority, control or services. Accordingly,
65% of Internally Displaced Persons within Yemen choose to
fnd safety or confict resolution through their local leader. When
international aid organizations intervene to provide resources or
Figure 1: Map of Yemen showing the front lines of the war. (by the
American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project as of 01/02/2018;
source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-22/whos-to-blame-for-pestilence-near-famine-in-yemen-quicktake)
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services to these displaced populations, these groups often rely
on the regional social structure through “approval of sheikhs” before intervening in the local communities (Alsabahi & Desantis,
2016). However, this can lead to an uneven distribution of needed resources, as illuminated by a study undertaken by Oxfam
and published by the Yemen Community Engagement Working
Group. In the study, 48% of respondents felt that humanitarian
aid in Yemen was not reaching the most vulnerable populations.
Arguably the most vulnerable or marginalized populations, such
as the elderly, mentally disabled, or illiterate people, have difculties accessing information about humanitarian assistance
and consequently accessing the direct assistance.
Identifying the most vulnerable groups in Yemeni society is
even further complicated by continuous societal discrimination towards certain minority groups.These marginalized
groups, which often do not belong to a more organized “tribe”
or have a sheikh, are overlooked when aid organizations come
into the country to ofer humanitarian assistance. Because
these minorities often have no organizational leader or group,
either due to their informality or institutional discrimination
against them, they have no credible or informed representative to advocate for them while navigating the international
aid process (Alsabahi & Desantis, 2016). This further exacerbates social inequality and prevents aid from reaching the
most at-risk groups in Yemen.
Yemen’s Civil War and Political Turmoil
Similar to many other countries in the region, Yemen is facing
an intense water crisis with efects magnifed by several political and cultural factors. The country is currently in the midst of
a proxy civil war between Saudi Arabia and Iran being fought
on Yemen soil. The Saudi forces support the current Yemeni
President Hadi, while Iran supports Houthi rebels (Asia News
Monitor, 2018). In addition to this regional political tension
being fought in Yemen between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the alQaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State (IS)
have manipulated the regional instability and established a haven for terrorist activity and deadly attacks (Asia News Monitor,
2018). These violent quarrels exacerbate social inequality and
increase the vulnerability of environmental management on a
local and national scale. Instability leads to the lack of distribution of resources/public facilities, which can lead to private entities taking advantage of the situation through privatization,
public resource deprivation, and the black market. When these
critical resources are taken away, civilians often turn to the violence out of desperation, necessity, and security.
The tribal organization of Yemen is also infuential when
dealing with land and water disputes, which contributes to
regional, smaller, and more frequent spurts of violence. The
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Government of Yemen estimates that this type of violence “results in deaths of some 4,000 people each year,” and probably
contributes to “more [fatalities] than the secessionist violence
in the south, the armed rebellion in the north, and Yemeni alQaeda terrorism combined” (Hales, 2010, p. 2). These conficts
have historically catalyzed collective, more organized violence,
threatening stability in the greater public arena. In the context
of Yemen urban areas, especially areas where new land developments are taking place, “disputes over ownership of, or access to, natural resources such as land and water” have become
the “most prevalent type of social violence” (Hales, 2010, p. 2).
The confict over water is strongly associated with land issues,
due to control over sources of surface water and particular
territory that accesses upstream water. “Dam construction...
channel ‘improvements’” and other man-made alterations of
the water infrastructure can “interfere with delicate social balances” due to the fragility of the diverse communities and their
interrelationships (Hales, 2010, p. 3). Pre-existing environmental conditions like low levels of rainfall and lack of permanent
rivers intensify these concerns even further.
However, due to the increase in groundwater withdrawal over
the last thirty years, access to the underground aquifer has
become a more critical territorial resource. Property owners,
including domestic, industrial, and agriculture users, have continued to dig deeper wells in order to ensure their own share
of the aquifer’s water (Al-Hamdi, 2000). Yemen’s constitution
“declares all natural resources to be a state property” but “the
absence of a detailed legal framework, the lack of proper institutional setup to administer and manage water resources, and
the weak capacity of the government to implement and en-

Table 1: Factors transforming
water competition into confict.
(Hales, Muggah & LeBrun, 2010)
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force water-related policies”prevent further action from being
taken (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 72). This has contributed to a confict
“among well owners drawing water from the same aquifer...
lead[ing] to a ‘race to the bottom,’” contributing to rapid land
subsistence and threatening the potential for renewable recharge of the aquifer (Hales, 2010, p. 4). These factors related
to competition and confict over water resources are further
detailed in Table 1 below. These cumulative factors, including a
weak political system and a tribal social organization, constant
regional violence, and arid climatic conditions make Yemen’s
current situation “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world”
(Asia News Monitor 2018), the United Nations claims.
Sana’a Current Water Supply and Public Infrastructure
Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries, compared
both to other countries in Southwest Asia and also on a global
scale. “The annual per capita availability of freshwater is 120
m³, which is only about 10 percent of the regional [Middle
East] average” of available freshwater, meaning Yemen’s freshwater is only 10% of the national average of other surrounding
neighbor countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman. Internationally, this water availability is “less than 2 percent of the global
average” (Hales, 2010, p. 3). Yemen also has no permanent rivers, making water availability continually fuctuating with the
season and resultantly inconsistent.
Due to lack of available surface water, groundwater aquifers
are the primary source of water for urban areas and agricultural
irrigation in Yemen, which together make up 70% of the total
water use (Al-Weshali, et al., 2015:, p. 216). The national rate of
depletion of groundwater is twice the recharge, meaning that

Factor

Explanation

Predictability
of flow

More predictable flow creates the conditions for consensus about resource
management; spate events give rise to intense stress and conflict.

Number of
users

Large shared systems generate more potential for stress as individual
control diminishes.

Visibility

Surface water flows are easier to measure and manage, but being visible
may quickly give rise to conflict; groundwater sources are not.

‘Symmetry of cause
and effect’

More direct competition between individuals is more likely to trigger conflict
than, for example, depletion of groundwater affecting a broad community.

Power relations

Large power imbalances between winners and losers tend to mitigate
conflicts.

External interference

The state, donors, and others can trigger conflict when they interfere with
existing water management practices or ignore the management and
maintenance implications of new infrastructure projects.

Hales, G., Muggah, R., & LeBrun, E. (2010). Under pressure: Social violence over land and water i
Yemen (Rep. No. 2). Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
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p. 6). This trend was illustrated by the following; “the number
of wells in the basin went up from a few hundred in 1973 to
around 6000 wells in 2001, and 8000 wells in 2009... the water
balance of the Sana’a Basin indicates [extractions] to be fve
times higher than recharge” (Al-Weshali, et al., 2015, p. 221). If
the region continues to extract water at a constant rate, predictions state that the “total usable storage would be depleted
within 32 years” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 5).

Figure 2: A woman carries jerrycans to fll with water from a
charity tap in Sana'a. (CCTV/Facebook; source: https://www.
middleeastmonitor.com/20171121-2-5m-lack-access-to-freshclean-water-in-yemen-says-red-cross/)

the groundwater supply is not being renewed at a sustainably
sufcient rate and will have signifcant long-term environmental consequences once the groundwater depletes to the point
of no recharge.
Yemen established a domestic infrastructure to aid water
management by founding the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA), the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, and
the Ministry of Electricity and Water (Al-Hamdi, 200, p. 3-4). In
2002, the Sana’a Water Basin was “designated as one of the fve
critical basins” within Yemen. The National Water Resources
Authority even established a Sana’a Branch in 2003 to directly
implement water resources management for the Sana’a Basin
region (JICA, 2007, p. 1). Although the establishment of these
government-backed water and water-associated institutions
was a great improvement for Yemen’s water infrastructure,
their execution is limited and generally unsuccessful. These
companies “only supply some households in the major cities
and 70% of Yemenis live in rural areas” (Whitehead, 2015); however, with a growing global trend towards urbanization, these
demographics will shift towards growing urban populations.
Insecurity is even more magnifed in Sana’a, the country’s capital
city and the most stressed water basin in the country. Because
of the lack of surface water, the basin’s reliance on groundwater
(especially in the last several decades) has increased exponentially. The city’s growing population places extra strain on the
water supply, with a predicted basin population of 6.06 million
by 2025 (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 4). The Tawilah aquifer provides all
water needs for the Sana’a basin. Water usage in the city increased rapidly “after the identifcation of the Tawilah aquifer
in 1972 and the establishment of the NWRA” (Al-Hamdi, 2000,

This dramatic and concerning reality in Sana’a, due to the public
infrastructure’s fnancial limitations, lack of sufcient water supply, and the high demand for a water municipal system within
the urban area, have led the National Water and Sanitation Authority and other government agencies to agree to provide an
“intermittent” water system to “maximize its coverage and implement a policy of equitable access to water” (Al-Hamdi, 2000,
p. 30). However, even with these eforts towards improvement,
only 40-50% of houses in Sana’a are connected to the public
water supply (Al-Hamdi, 2000). The existing pipe network is estimated to lose up to 60% of the water due to leaks (Whitehead,
2015), and the “systematic low pressure in the system..and the
local topography” contribute to a system that fails to accomplish its goal of equally supplying every part of each zone of
the city (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 30). The weak central government
in Yemen prevents any substantial improvement of urban water
management, infrastructure, or policy.
Consequently, the city is reliant on private suppliers to provide
the remaining water demand. The most common and predominant form of private water is “tanker supplies.” The process consists of a tank owner, who is also the middleman and
proft-maker, purchasing water from a well-owner. The tank
owner sells the water for a much higher price, which is often defended by “the high cost of operation and maintenance of the
truck and... the long hours of waiting to sell a tanker load” (AlHamdi, 2000, p. 30). The water is stored in household ground
tanks to “bridge the unreliable 24 hour-cycle supply,” although
this water is presumed by consumers’ to be “poor contaminated
quality,” creating yet another commercial opportunity for clean
drinking water in Sana’a (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 30).
In the Sana’a basin, the agricultural sector produces Khat,
grapes, and vegetables, all of which require intensive irrigation, using 85% of the groundwater extraction in this specifc
water basin of Yemen (Al-Weshali et al., 2015, p. 221). Many Khat
farmers use “expensive pipes and plastic tubes” to direct water
from the underground aquifer to the Earth’s surface, rather than
earthen channels (Al-Hamdi 2000: 100). The farmer’s expensive
investments in more advanced and intensive infrastructure are
“driven by the limited supply” given many shareholders may all
be extracting water from a single well. Farmers justify this more
“extensive use of pipes” by claiming to “minimize conveyance

104 ■

Faculty and Student Work

losses associated with the use of earthen channels” (Al-Hamdi,
2000, p. 100).
Additionally, Sana’a’s geography and environmental conditions
pose challenges for water management. The city is located
2,300 meters above sea level, which complicates getting access
to water from rural places considering Yemen’s poor infrastructure and difcult geography (Hovden, 2015). William Cosgrove,
a Middle East water resources expert and former World Bank
specialist, claims that Sana’s problems are more complicated
than just an aquifer running out of water, “but also that the city
is hundreds of kilometres from the sea and has no alternative
water supply” (Mis, 2015). This geographic landlock puts the
city at odds to fnd creative solutions to water scarcity.
Incorporating Global Water Management in Sana’a
Global water management schemes often target developing nations with extreme water insecurity. In this case, Sana’a received
funding from the World Bank to “solve the groundwater problem
in agriculture,” also known as the Sana’a Basin Water Management Program (Ward, 2015, p. 98). By signing onto this project in
2003, Yemen “committed itself to a long-term process [to transition to] Integrated Water Resource Management” (Ward 2015:
98), an intersectional phenomenon of water management and
globalization being pushed by many intergovernmental organizations, especially the World Bank. By signing onto this program,
Yemen is taking substantial strides towards becoming a more
globalized and incorporated city, for better or for worse.
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included testing technology, analyzing supply and demand approaches to management, and organizational infrastructure,
lasted from 2003-2010. After this phase in the program, the
national governance began to plan for and implement the program by setting up political infrastructure, assessing and monitoring water resources, managing public awareness campaigns,
and implementing measures for regulation (Ward, 2015).
Particularly regarding infrastructure, eforts towards enhancing water supply included improving structures for groundwater recharge, education on sustainable water management
and improving the efciency of water usage within agricultural
“Water Users Associations,” and investing in better technology like regional water pipelines and drip irrigation systems
(Ward, 2015). Besides, technical support regarding water effciency and irrigation productivity were provided to farmers.
Results proved that these strategies towards limiting water
use pumped 40% less water yet still increased incomes by 10
percent (Ward, 2015). This frst phase of the program, which piloted IWRM approaches in Sana’a, demonstrated their success.
Unfortunately, continuation and progress towards expanding
the program have been put at a halt (possibly due to the political instability), which has prevented the transition to the offcial “2nd and 3rd phases” (Ward, 2015), despite the expired
15-year time frame of the program. Integrated Water Resource
Management through the Sana’a Basin Water Management
Program was limitedly successful in its preliminary eforts, but
its lack of complete execution leaves Sana’a in an interim and
uncompleted status of development.

Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) is touted as
“arguably the most infuential global paradigm in water governance” (Newig & Challies, 2013, p. 440). The program views
“fragmented and disjointed” water management through sector agencies as the major barrier preventing sustainable water
governance. IWRM acknowledges and incorporates “underlying social and environmental drivers of change in planning”
which infuence water sectors, such as agriculture, energy,
industry, municipal supply, and ecosystem management and
preservation (Newig & Challies, 2013, p. 440). The three pillars
of sustainability, including social equity, economic growth, and
the environment, are incorporated into the IWRM strategy. Critics of IWRM argue that these concepts are intertwined with debates regarding “public versus private governance” and water
as a commodity versus public good and human right (Newig &
Challies, 2013, p. 440). The overall global consensus regarding
IWRM is that its impacts are “at best marginal,” with a recorded
20 out of 95 countries reporting “formal implementation” of its
principles (Newig & Challies, 2013, p. 440).

Groundwater Contamination in Sana’a

The Sana’a Basin Water Management Program was budgeted
and fnanced for a full 15-year implementation. Phase 1, which

Sana’a’s current waste management is limited and poorly run;
a public sewage system covers 29% of the population in urban

Sana’a is faced with issues of water scarcity, distribution, and
contamination regarding surface and groundwater. The latter
issue is one that directly threatens all water resources, both
above and below ground, which the urban area of Sana’a is
reliant on. This is in large part due to the poor or completely
lacking public waste infrastructure in Sana’a. It is not simple
to “remediate” or re-clean water to its original state once it has
been polluted. The consequences of contaminated water are
far-reaching, creating “health problems for human beings and
animals, deterioration of farmland (e.g. lowering the yields of
crops), and adverse impact on the environment” (JICA, 200, p.:
13). Water contamination is even more threatening in developing countries, as “outbreaks of waterborne diseases usually
associated with gastrointestinal symptoms and increasing carcinogenicity created by certain organic chemicals” enters the
main water supply, having widespread implications in public
and environmental health (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 52).
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areas. This sewage system utilizes a wastewater treatment facility, which “drained directly to an open channel.” Unfortunately, many uneducated farmers use this waste discharge for irrigation purposes, which poses a health risk and threatens the
produce and fresh vegetables grown for Sana’a’s urban population. As a consequence, the National Water and Resource Authority of Sana’a Basin has “started to raise awareness among
farmers not to use the drained water.” Unused water has “infltrated into the ground...and the quality of groundwater downstream of the treatment plant has become worse” (JICA, 2007,
p. 3). Domestic wastewater can also contaminate groundwater
through “widespread use of on-site disposal facilities, leakage
from sewer lines or infltration from treatment facilities such as
oxidation ponds” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 50).
Approximately 75% of the population does not reach the public sewage network and relies on the cesspit, an underground
pit that holds liquid waste and sewage, as their primary form
of waste disposal (Al-Hamdi ,2000:, p.50). In the case of heavy
rain fow, rainwater overfows the cesspit and spreads contaminated water in previously clean areas. Cesspits have also
proven to pollute the groundwater by infltration through the
soil, which threatens the safety and hygiene of the entire reliable water supply that Sana’a depends on. In Sana’a, “several
hundred private wells” were proven to be afected by sewage
contamination (JICA, 200, p. 12). This contaminated water in
Sana’a’s central inner city area has a nitrate concentration two
to three times higher than the “permissible limit for drinking
water” according to the World Health Organization’s health
standards (JICA, 2007, p. 13). Cesspits also threaten to disturb
the pre-existing National Water and Sanitation Authority distribution network of sewage, particularly in identifable areas
more vulnerable to cesspit clogging and collection of wastewater in ponds (Al-Hamdi, 2000).
There is also concern regarding inadequate waste disposal in
petrol stations, car service shops, medical units, and industry,
mostly due to the lack of wastewater treatment facilities for
these establishments. The disposal of wastewater from these
sites is assumed to be uncontrolled, unregulated, and within
the discretion of individual stakeholders (JICA, 2007, p. 13).
This potential contamination poses a public health risk for
those exposed to or in proximity to these establishments.
Government Subsidies and Limited Groundwater Supply
The Yemen government has little control over managing the extraction of groundwater. Government policy incentives, such as
diesel subsidies, encourage well extraction, efectively stimulating inefcient and unsustainable water use for irrigation. These
incentives are still prevalent and continue to magnify the consequences of poor water management (Al-Weshali et al., 2015).
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Due to the Yemen government subsidization of fuel, private interests cheaply power water pumps (causing it to over-extract)
and make a proft by selling it privately. Private entities drill
new unregulated wells geographically near public ones, which
threatens the groundwater supply and creates a privatized
black market for water resources (Hovden, 2015). These private
agencies are also well aware that the public infrastructure in
Yemen is not able to support itself and its reinforcement and
maintenance is lacking or non-existent. These private companies can manipulate the water prices due to their monopoly
over the scarce resource and overcharge the impoverished and
desperate urban Yemeni community.
The Yemen government has also placed a fnancial subsidy on
“imported grains” which has pushed out the grain industry and
creates a national reliance on outsourced cereal crops. This
shift in cropping pattern has led to the more intensive cultivation of “water-demanding cash crops, particularly Khat, grapes,
and vegetables” which depletes the domestic water supply
faster than grain crops (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 109). This import
subsidy also lowered the national market price of cereals in Yemen, resulting in grain cultivation that “covers less than 5% of
the agricultural land in the basin” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 85).
Environmental Consequences of Khat Addiction
Although there are natural constraints based on Yemen’s geography and physical environment, other factors such as cultural
norms, government behaviors, political unrest, and policy decisions are escalating and magnifying the water shortage. The
widespread habit of chewing low-stimulant “khat” is just one of
these factors contributing to water scarcity in Sana’a (Hovden,
2015). The drug is a “full-blown national addiction” with “90%
of men and 25% of women regularly chewing the leaves” (Butters, 2015). Chewing khat is considered the country’s primary
form of socializing, given that the predominantly Muslim population is banned from consuming standard drugs or alcohol.
Culturally, Khat infuences the Yemeni population in several
ways. It encourages “complacency” about the government failings. Furthermore, Khat contributes to an unproductive work
environment because it “keeps the country awake,” which enforces staying up late and sleeping in, and pushes establishments to open much later in the day (Butters, 2009). The effects of Khat delays the urgency that must be ignited to create
widespread societal change. It also leads to exclusionary “khat
ceremonies” which reinforces gender inequality. On the other
hand, it can also be attributed to keeping people calm during
situations of crisis, which happen quite frequently during a Civil War, and also “keeping them of the streets” (Butters, 2009).
These unintended consequences of heavy Khat use could be
a signifcant reason why the country is struggling in so many
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ways, and staying away from the substance might be part of
the solution towards shaping a positive future for Yemen.
A regular user’s daily dose of Khat costs approximately fve
US dollars. Considering the extreme poverty and other more
pressing needs of the growing population, it is quite astounding that so much of the population is still consistently purchasing and chewing khat. Most families spend more money on
Khat than on food (Butters, 2009). The Khat market demand
allows for cultivator’s to spend excessive amounts of valuable
water to grow the plant, and the profts make it worthwhile
for the farmers. The standard “annual income of a Qat [Khat]
farmer...is more than twice the national average of per capita
income” (Al-Weshali et al., 2015, p. 223) and “certainly provides
a steadier income than growing vegetables” (Butters 2009). Because this habit is widespread in Yemeni culture, its usage is
uncontrolled and continually provides demand in the market.
Growing Khat, “a shrub whose young leaves contain a compound with efects similar to those of amphetamines,” requires
intensive and routine irrigation (Butters, 2009). The Sana’a Basin is environmentally optimal conditions for Khat cultivation.
“The plant thrives in the high hill country” and “is easy to grow
and harvest.” To cultivate Khat felds successfully, they must be
“fooded twice a month” and consequently consume approximately 30% of the national water supply (Butters, 2009). These
agricultural techniques are sucking the limited water from
Sana’a’s Basin which could be used in other capacities to maximize the utility of the precious resource.
According to Al-Weshali et. al.’s article Diesel Subsidies and Yemen Politics: Post-2011 crises and their impact on groundwater
use and agriculture, around “85% of [national] khat production
comes from fve governorates located only in the highlands
region of the country” including Sana’a’s greater water basin
(Al-Weshali et al., 2015, p. 223). Khat agriculture “is estimated to
cover around 1/3 of the total area” in Sana’a” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p.
5). Groundwater extraction for Khat cultivation is often shared or
split between many shareholders invested in one well. Although
this “network of shareholding” may clash with the regional “tribal structures” which shape the social landscape, the possibility
for “improve[d] awareness and facilitat[ed] collective action to
reduce water abstraction” are potential areas of improvement
regarding sustainable groundwater management (Al-Hamdi,
2000, p. 107). A hydrologist and local director of a German technical-assistance advising team for water management, argues
that on a national level, quitting khat would double the amount
of household water available, a remarkable potential improvement given the already-threatened water supply (Butters, 2009).
The national Khat addiction feeds into the increasing water
scarcity in the region due to its high demand and costly irri-
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gation requirement. The drug limits educational initiative to
change the way things are in Yemen - and helps people mentally cope with their often violent or impoverished surroundings. Nonetheless, this tradition is creating widespread complacency for societal issues, creating a norm of unproductivity
and unmotivation which hinders change, while also prioritizing water to go towards Khat irrigation instead of more necessary social needs like running water and food.
Looking Forward, Possible Solutions
Future water supply options for Sana’a will be organized into
two categories, either in-basin water resources or out-of-basin
alternatives. Regardless, Yemen’s national government should
clearly defne water ownership and water use rights. This could
be achieved through the “establishment and enforcement of
both boundary and authority rules,” which would clarify and
identify access to groundwater (by halting the continuous
increase in pumpers taking from the aquifer). Establishing authority rules would “reinforce [the political] boundary” and its
scope in Yemeni society (Al-Hamdi, 2000).
Some in-basin options include “enhance[d] utilization of rainwater, intra-basin transfer... reallocation of water from agriculture to municipal use, and utilization of unconventional
water resources” through wastewater reuse (Al-Hamdi, 2000,
p. 45). Another proposed solution to addressing Sana’a’s water
crisis is for the local municipality to purchase well-water that
would’ve gone towards agriculture or private companies. This
would be a cheaper alternative compared to shipping water
in from abroad. However, it would require political reform and
changes to Yemen’s constitution (Whitehead, 2015).
Out-of-basin or “imported water” options consist of inter-basin
or regional transfers of surface water from various sources such
as Surdud, Marib, or the Red Sea (Al-Hamdi, 2000). However,
developing the infrastructure to execute this and the costs associated with inter-basin water transfer “face high costs that
range from 1.7 to 6.4 times higher than the current expensive
option of private tanker supply” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 45). Specifcally regarding out-of-basin alternatives, “political, social,
legal and technical” barriers should also be taken into account.
Public education to promote lower water use in farming communities could also help reduce the risk of water insecurity in
the future. “Better agricultural extension, introduction of water-saving technology, and information assistance to shift to
other crops” are all valid and productive ways to reduce water
use. Eventually, the Yemen government should “seek to invest
in an alternative economic base” rather than relying on the current water-based economy (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 107).
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Yemen has immense disadvantages. It is in a region of the
world facing geopolitical confict, lack of government control,
and growing populations. These factors magnify the pre-existing regional water scarcity, which is impacting every country in
the Middle East, but particularly Yemen. The capital of Yemen,
Sana’a, is one mega-urban area threatened by water insecurity.
Sana’a is currently reliant on a groundwater aquifer which is
rapidly depleting and becoming contaminated. Cultural factors, such as tribal organization and national addiction to Khat,
prevent policy initiatives from successfully mitigating future
water shortages and obstacles. On a global scale, Yemen is a
country in dire need of international support and guidance.
While these issues facing Sana’a threaten regional stability, it
also serves as an opportunity for potential productive change
through positive Yemeni leadership and outside actors to help
Yemen out of its humanitarian crisis.

…
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